BA Grant: Epistemic Consequentlalism

I’ve been awarded a grant from the British Academy for a project on epistemic consequentialism, together with my co-investigator, Jeff Dunn (DePauw). As part of the project, we’ll be organising a workshop at LSE’s Centre for the Philosophy of Natural and Social Science (CPNSS) in 2014 and an international conference on epistemic consequentialism at the University of Kent in 2015.

Videos on the Virtue of Deference

The Character Project has put up two videos featuring the research I conducted as part of that project. In the first one, I introduce my research on the virtue of deference:

The second video is of my talk on the virtue of deference at the final conference of the Character Project at Wake Forest University in June of this year:

Epistemic Paternalism: A Defence

Epistemic Paternalism

Palgrave Macmillan published my new book today: Epistemic Paternalism: A Defence. The book argues that our tendencies for overconfidence give us reason to accept that we are sometimes justified in interfering with the inquiry of another without his consent but for his own epistemic good. Because when it comes to our freedom to conduct inquiry in whatever way we see fit, more is not always better. In fact, less is often more.

Epistemic Agency in Philosophical Issues

My paper ‘Why We Cannot Rely on Ourselves for Epistemic Improvement‘ is now out in Philosophical Issues. The paper argues that recent results in empirical psychology suggests that the proper role of epistemic agency in us avoiding or correcting for cognitive bias can be expected to be highly limited.

The Epistemology of Inclusiveness

The online version of a special issue of Synthese on the Epistemology of Inclusiveness that I’ve guest edited together with Klemens Kappel and Nikolaj Jang Lee Linding Pedersen is now out. The issue contains contributions by Sanford Goldberg, Helene Landemore, Christopher Thompson, Fabienne Peter, J. D. Trout, Boaz Miller, and Miranda Fricker.

Review of Cappelen in PQ

I have a review coming out in Philosophical Quarterly of Herman Cappelen‘s book Philosophy Without Intuitions (OUP 2012). The final draft of the review can be accessed here. It’s a really nice book, and one that’s worth a read for anyone interested in recent debates about intuitions in philosophy.

Two Papers on Epistemic Value

I have two papers on epistemic value coming out shortly. “Meno and the Monist” will appear in Metaphilosophy, and argues that critics of monism have little to gain from turning to Plato’s Meno for support, contrary to what is supposed in the literature. “Getting it Right” is co-authored with Stephen Grimm, and will appear in Philosophical Studies. The paper develops a novel kind of monism, accuracy monism, and argues that it carries more promise than traditional forms of value monism and pluralism.


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