I’m Senior Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of Kent, Canterbury. My research investigates one of the most fundamental notions in epistemology—i.e., epistemic value, or that which is properly pursued when we want to find out what the world is like—in order to determine how to set up social institutions in a way that promotes such value.
In recent work, I have defended the idea that true belief is the only fundamental epistemic value. Relying on that theory of value, I have also:
- defended a consequentialist virtue epistemology against both virtue responsibilists and credit theorists, and explored the de-biasing potentials of virtues of deference and listening, as part of Wake Forest’s Character Project;
- argued that our dual tendency for bias and overconfidence gives us reason to accept a form of epistemic paternalism on which we’re sometimes justified in interfering with the inquiry of others without their consent but for their own epistemic good; and
- explored the problem of public ignorance, pitfalls of social deliberation, and prospects for using information markets for informed and legitimate decision-making in liberal democracies.
At present, I’m involved in two projects investigating
- the problems and prospects for epistemic consequentialism. The project is conducted together with Jeff Dunn (DePauw) and funded by the British Academy. As part of the project, Jeff and I are editing a volume on epistemic consequentialism for Oxford University Press.
- the virtues and vices of cognitive outsourcing, i.e., of handing over (outsourcing) one’s information collection and processing (the cognitive) to others. The project is conducted as part of Lund University‘s £1.7M project Knowledge in a Digital World, funded by the Swedish Research Council (Vetenskapsrådet).
My contact information is as follows:
Department of Philosophy
Cornwallis North West
University of Kent
Canterbury, Kent CT2 7NF
Office: +44 (0)1227 81 6105